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can not only be either true or false, but can be held with varying degrees of belief, the inference 1 0 1 of DA is probabilistically invalid (p-invalid) because there are coherent 4 probability assignments 1 0 2 to premises and conclusion for which the probability of the conclusion is lower than the sum of 1 0 3 the probabilities of the premises (Adams, 1998; Over, 2016) . Therefore, just like in the binary 1 0 4 case DA does not preserve truth from premises to conclusion, in the probabilistic case DA does 1 0 5 not preserve probability from premises to conclusion, so that it would be warranted to have a high 1 0 6 degree of belief in the premises and yet a very low degree of belief in the conclusion. In order to 1 0 7 justify the conclusion in a particular instantiation of the argument, we would have to bring further 1 0 8 information into the discussion beyond that contained in the premises. Applied to the JIF 1 0 9 example, suppose we assume that if a paper is published in a high impact factor journal, it is of Two statements are coherent if and only if they respect the axioms of probability theory. For example, these axioms state that if we believe it is 80% likely to rain, then in order for our beliefs to be coherent we should also be willing to believe that it is 20% likely not to rain, otherwise the probabilities involved would not sum up to 1. 7 high quality, and then encounter a paper that is published in a low impact factor journal. From 1 1 1 this alone it is not justified to conclude that the paper we encountered is not of high quality. In 1 1 2 order to draw such a conclusion we would require more information.
Denial of the antecedent (DA) is of course not the only inference one can draw on the 1 1 4 basis of the conditional belief that if a paper is published in a high impact factor journal, then it is 1 1 5 of high quality. A similar, deductively valid inference results if we add a further premise to DA:
"If a paper is not published in a high impact factor journal, then it is not of high quality". One can 1 1 7 combine this new conditional premise with the conditional premise that we already had: "If a 1 1 8 paper is published in a high impact factor journal, then it is of high quality", to obtain the 1 1 9 following biconditional premise: "A paper is published in a high impact factor journal if and only 1 2 0 if it is of high quality". From this biconditional premise (or equivalently from the two conditional 1 2 1 premises) together with the premise that a specific paper was not published in a high impact 1 2 2 factor journal, one can indeed validly conclude that the paper is not of high quality. However, this 1 2 3 inference will only be useful if one believes the biconditional premise to a non-negligible degree 1 2 4 in the first place. If the biconditional premise is implausible, then any deductively valid 1 2 5 conclusion based on it will also tend to be implausible, precisely because it follows logically 1 2 6 from an implausible starting assumption. Considering that most scientists are likely to agree that 1 2 7 it is not only implausible but false that a paper is of high quality if and only if it is published in a 1 2 8 high impact factor journal, the fact that the inference from this biconditional is valid has no use 1 2 9 for practical purposes. One could argue that deduction, and with it logical validity, has little impact on actual 1 3 2 reasoning and decision making outside of the mathematics classroom, and that therefore the An inductive inference that might describe well the use of the impact factor is the 1 3 7 informal fallacy of the argument from ignorance (or its Latin equivalent "ad ignorantiam"). This 1 3 8 argument tries to justify a conclusion by pointing out that there is no evidence against it. Typical examples could be "No side effects were found for this treatment in clinical trials. Therefore this 1 4 0 treatment is safe" or "No one has proven that ghosts do not exist. Therefore ghosts exist" (Hahn , 2007; Oaksford & Hahn, 2004 , 2007 . In the case of the JIF, if a paper comes from a 1 4 2 high impact journal this can be seen as a sign suggesting it is an excellent piece of work. But as 1 4 3 we saw above in the discussion of DA, this does not imply that if the paper was published in a 1 4 4 low impact factor journal this is a sign suggesting that the quality of the paper is low. A more 1 4 5 precise description of the situation would be that a low impact factor journal lacks the sign of 1 4 6 high quality that a high JIF provides. If a paper is published in a low impact journal then we have 1 4 7 less information about its quality, rather than having information suggesting that its quality is 1 4 8 low. It is an argument from ignorance to use the absence of impact factor based evidence for high 1 4 9 quality to conclude that a paper is of low quality. being the case is in the situation at hand. Suppose we search a book in a library catalogue and do 1 5 3 not find it. In this case it is reasonable to use the lack of information about the book in the and do not see a particular town listed, it is reasonable to conclude that the train does not stop in 1 5 6 that town. However, suppose we are planning a party and have invited the whole department, in 1 5 7 the hope that a particular person we are attracted to will attend. In this case a lack of information 1 5 8 9 indicating that the person will come does not warrant the conclusion that the person will not uncertainty about the quality and the need to gather more information in order to be able to Two further inductive inferences that might be relevant in accounting for the use of the treatment is safe. Therefore the treatment is safe", "My parents say that Santa Claus exists. Therefore Santa Claus exists" or "My peers say that clothing item x is great. Therefore clothing 1 7 3 item x is great". In the case of the JIF, a high impact factor of a journal would play the role of an 1 7 4 authority for the quality of the papers within it. In contrast, the ad hominem argument tries to justify the rejection of a conclusion by treatment was developed by a person with no formal degree in the subject. Therefore the 1 7 8 treatment is not safe", or "A person without a driver's license says "don't drink alcohol while driving". Therefore, it is false that you should not drink alcohol while driving". In the case of the 1 8 0 JIF, a low impact factor would be used to give a journal a reputation of low quality, and this low 1 8 1 quality reputation would then be transferred to the papers within it. hand. Policy decisions are routinely based on the advice of experts, and there seems to be 1 8 6 agreement that this is a good thing to do, as long as the experts are really considered experts in it is often more difficult, because it has to be made plausible that those attributes are relevant to 1 9 0 the quality of the argument. For example, that one does not need to be a mother to be qualified 1 9 1 for being prime minister seems obvious, whereas a case of a person applying to a position against 1 9 2 gender discrimination, who in his private life beats his wife, is likely to be more controversial. In 1 9 3 the case of the JIF, we would have to justify why we think that a low impact factor indicates that 1 9 4 a particular journal is of low quality, and why this low quality can be transferred to a particular 1 9 5 paper within it. Such a judgment requires further information about the journal and about the 1 9 6 paper at hand to be justified, which is usually not provided. Thus, whereas a high impact factor 1 9 7 may add to the reputation of a journal, a low impact factor does not warrant a bad reputation, but 1 9 8 rather provides insufficient information about reputation (see Table 1 for examples of the 1 9 9 inductive and deductive fallacies as discussed here).
Until now we have discussed inferences on the basis of the belief that if a paper is 2 0 4 published in a high impact factor journal, then it is of high quality. But although this belief can 2 0 5 sometimes be useful as a quick approximation or rule of thumb, it is often itself not warranted. average breadth of interest in these papers during the first years after publication, which is not the 2 0 8 same as research quality (e. g. a high quality paper may have low citation rates because it is 2 0 9 addressed to a small, highly specialised audience, or because its significance is only realised five 2 1 0 years after publication; and a paper may have high citation rates because of highly consequential 2 1 1 flaws within it). But more specifically, it is often not warranted because the inference from a 2 1 2 metric defined at the journal level to the features of an individual paper within that journal 2 1 3 involves an ecological fallacy. find a manuscript with more than twelve citations per year in a lower impact journal exceeds the 2 2 0 likelihood of finding such manuscript in a higher impact journal. This type of ecological fallacy 2 2 1 occurs when the distribution of citations is heavily and differentially skewed within each higher 2 2 2 level unit, i.e. the journals. This is typically the case when it comes to citation rates of journals manuscripts that were cited several hundred times in the previous two years, but many others that 2 2 5
were not cited at all during the same period. Such a citation pattern would result in a heavily individual level) concluding that a manuscript in the journal with a higher JIF is of better quality 2 3 0 12 (or of broader interest) involves an ecological fallacy, because it is possible that the likelihood of 2 3 1 finding a manuscript with more citations in the lower impact journal is in fact similar or even 2 3 2 higher. With this comment, we hope to have highlighted some misconceptions in the beliefs and 2 3 5 arguments involved in using journal based metrics, and specifically the JIF, for evaluating the 2 3 6 work of scientists. While some of the thoughts described here are introduced to illustrate the most 2 3 7 controversial arguments, others better approximate the reality of decision making in academia. In 2 3 8 this exercise, it is surprising to see many political and academic institutions as well as scientists having believed for so long that they are evaluating the "quality of science" while they are keen 2 4 0 to provide weak arguments, draw invalid conclusions, or weigh their lack of information and 2 4 1 uncertainty about the subject when using the JIF. From an economic perspective, however, it might in fact be a successful strategy to on the JIF, and it might also be better to have a weak argument than to have no argument.
4 5
Evaluating the quality of a scientist's work surely is a time consuming process and it takes much 2 4 6 more effort than simply comparing impact factors. Accordingly, deans, commissions, or 2 4 7 institutions which might not have the resources for an actual assessment of "scientific excellence" If a paper is published in a high impact factor journal, then it is of high quality. This paper is not published in a high impact factor journal. Therefore, this paper is not of high quality.
Inductive fallacies

Argument from ignorance
It is not known that p is true (false). Therefore p is false (true).
The book is not listed in the library catalogue. Therefore, the book is not in the library.
No one has proven that ghosts do not exist.
Therefore, ghosts exist. This paper does not have the quality sign of having been published in a high impact factor journal. Therefore, this paper is not of high quality.
Argument from authority
This expert says that p is true. Therefore p is true.
Medical experts say that this treatment is safe. Therefore, this treatment is safe.
My parents say that Santa Claus exists. Therefore, Santa Claus exists. This paper does not have the authority backing of having been published in a high impact factor journal. Therefore, this paper is not of high quality.
Ad hominem argument
This untrustworthy person says that p is true. Therefore p is false.
A person without training says that this treatment is safe. Therefore, this treatment is not safe.
A person without a driver's license says "don't drink alcohol while driving". Therefore, it is false that you should not drink alcohol while driving.
This
paper was published in a journal with low quality reputation due to a low impact factor. Therefore, this paper is not of high quality.
